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CAN LAW BE A SOURCE OF INSIGHT FOR
OTHER ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES?
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN*
ABSTRACT

Law has been a borrower but not a supplier. Law schools, in effect,
have been located on one-way streets, with ideas flowing in but nothing
going out. This essay is intended to begin a dialogue that could change the
one-way streets between law schools and other university departments into
two-way streets. I want to demonstrate that legal and jurisprudential
studies can be a source of ideasfor scholars in otherfields. In particular,
this essay argues that the legal concept of the burden of proof can
illuminate disputes between theorists of modernism and postmodernism.
INTRODUCTION

Law has been a borrower but not a supplier. Law schools, in effect, are
on one-way streets with ideas flowing in but nothing going out. As early
as the 1920s and 1930s, American legal realists drew extensively from the
empirical social sciences for guidance in legal scholarship. Then, in the
1970s, law professors started to commonly cite and rely upon scholarship
from fields as diverse as economics, continental philosophy, and literary
criticism.' But even now, when interdisciplinary work is all the rage across
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their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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the academy, non-law professors do not turn to legal scholarship as a
source of information or inspiration. Mark Tushnet describes this as the
"intellectual marginality of legal scholarship." 2 Law professors have
consistently borrowed ideas from other academic disciplines, but
professors from philosophy, history, sociology, and other fields have not
adopted insights from legal scholars. Similarly, Jack Balkin argues,
"Although law seems to be an especially susceptible discipline for
invasion, it does not appear to be very good at exporting its own concerns
into other fields." 3
The purpose of this Article is to begin a dialogue that could change the
one-way streets between law schools and other university departments into
two-way streets. The Article seeks to demonstrate that legal and
jurisprudential studies can be a potent source of ideas for scholars in other
fields. For example, legal scholarship could provide valuable insights for
philosophy, political theory, and literary criticism professors who are
interested in deconstruction, a complex and often misunderstood concept.
The many law professors who have written about or used deconstruction
over the past few decades might have worthwhile ideas that should be
shared with non-law professors. Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis,
which is central to legal practice, can be understood as a form of
institutionalized deconstruction.4
Stare decisis requires a court to consider and follow previously decided
cases (or precedents) that sufficiently resemble the instant or current case.
As it is sometimes phrased, courts should treat like cases alike. Stare
decisis thus institutionalizes conformity with the past, the following of
tradition or history, because the old (the earlier cases or precedents) is to
determine the outcome of the new (the instant case). But this practice also
forces lawyers and judges to question whether earlier cases or precedents
sufficiently resemble the instant case so as to be deemed controlling. For
instance, is a case that questions the constitutionality of a publicly
displayed crdche, standing alone, meaningfully different from an earlier
case that also involved a publicly displayed crdche, but with other
Christmas decorations? The answer is not self-evident. Because of this
problematic quality of stare decisis, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars

2. Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1205 (1981).
3. J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 949, 964 (1996).
4. For a description of deconsn-uction, in relation to philosophical hermeneutics and
communication theory, see Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem of Critique: Triangulating Habermas,
Derrida, and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 296 (2005). I briefly
explain deconstruction infra, p.156.
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often question the relevance of potential precedents. What, precisely, were
the facts in the precedents or earlier cases? What were the underlying
assumptions of those cases? What were the precise legal rules articulated
in the earlier cases? What were the intended implications of those earlier
decisions? Could not the earlier cases be understood in more than one
fashion? In short, the doctrine of stare decisis leads lawyers, judges, and
legal scholars to question the meaning of the earlier cases-to question, in
effect, the claims of tradition. In this sense, the practice of stare decisis
can be understood as an institutionalized form of deconstruction.
Therefore, the many law professors who have studied and written about
stare decisis might be able to provide insights to all sorts of
deconstructionists, regardless of academic discipline.5
This Article, though, focuses on a broader intellectual problem: the
conflict between the incommensurable paradigms of modernism and
postmodernism. Specifically, this Article elucidates the confrontation
between modernists and postmodernists by drawing upon the legal concept
of the burden of proof. This Article suggests, in other words, that the
concept of the burden of proof, drawn from law and legal scholarship, can
help scholars in other disciplines clarify the tensions between modernism
and postmodernism. Modernism and postmodernism cannot be
harmonized, reconciled, or reduced to one overarching paradigm.6
However, modernists and postmodernists often perform similar tasks and
use similar language. For instance, just as modernists do, some
postmodernists talk about truth, knowledge, and reason. Ultimately,
though, modernists and postmodernists each seem to live in "a different
world.",7 Postmodernism, according to Nancey Murphy, represents
a
8
"radical break from the thought patterns of Enlightened modernity."
Our current bearing along the "modern/postmodern" divide sparks
strongly divergent reactions that depend largely on which side of the
divide one stands. 9 Avowed modernists such as John Searle and Jtirgen
Habermas tend to view the possible crossing into postmodern lands as a
crisis or threat. Thomas L. Pangle's views typify this modernist perception
of postmodernism: "I mean to sound an alarm at what I see to be the civic

5. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948); RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).

6. A paradigm is a worldview, a set of presupposed beliefs that pervasively shapes one's
perceptions of and orientation toward the world.
7. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111 (2d ed. 1970).
8. NANCEY C. MURPHY, ANGLO-AMERICAN POSTMODERNITY 1 (1997).
9.

RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW CONSTELLATION: THE ETHICAL-POLITICAL HORIZONS OF

MODERNITY/POSTMODERNITY 201 (1991).
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irresponsibility, the spiritual deadliness, and the philosophic dogmatism of
this increasingly dominant trend of thinking."10 Meanwhile,
postmodernists such as Richard Rorty and Jean-Franqois Lyotard view the
crossing as an opportunity of exhilarating potential. Steven Best and
Douglas Kellner declare that the "postmodern turn" has produced "new
challenges, excitement, and possibilities to develop new modes of thought
and action.""
Over the last twenty years or so, many thinkers on both sides of the
divide have devoted enormous energy to showing that one position is
preferred and, ultimately, correct. As Best and Kellner observe, "there is
significant cultural capital at stake in the postmodern turn and thus also
interests, reputations, and concrete material investments. 1 2 Nonetheless,
the difficulty, as this Article shall argue, is that the varied arguments for
and against modernism and postmodernism have somewhat repetitive
rhetorical forms. Namely, this Article shall identify three forms of
contention that both modernists and postmodernists use in the clash
between the two paradigms. The first two forms or types, arguments of
repudiation and arguments of advocacy, are unsurprising, at least in their
general form. The third type, allocating the burden of proof, is more

obscure but most telling.
An understanding of the legal concept of the burden of proof can
illuminate the incommensurable paradigms of modernism and
postmodernism. Most simply, in a judicial dispute between two parties
that ends in equipoise, the party who bears the burden of proof loses.
Modernists and postmodernists both attempt to use a similar mechanism in
their disputes. Modernists claim that postmodernists bear the burden of
proof, while postmodernists place the burden on modernists. Thus, when
all else seems to fail, the allocation of the burden of proof can seem
determinative-modernists and postmodernists each claim supremacy
over the opposing paradigm, since the other side supposedly bears the
burden. Ultimately, though, the consistent and repetitive use of the three
forms of contention-repudiation arguments, advocacy arguments, and
especially burden-of-proof arguments-suggests that neither modernists
nor postmodernists can possibly win the conflict of paradigms in a
decisive fashion, in the sense of proving that one or the other is necessarily
right.

10.

THOMAS

L.

PANGLE,

THE ENNOBLING

OF DEMOCRACY:

THE CHALLENGE

POSTMODERN ERA 5 (1992).
11.

STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, THE POSTMODERN TURN 281 (1997).

12. Id. at 253.

OF

THE
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Modernism, as used in this Article, entails a commitment to a subjectobject metaphysics that traces back to Descartes: the subject or self is
separate from an objective world. In epistemology, then, modernists are
foundationalists: knowledge requires the subject to somehow access a firm
foundation or Archimedean point, typically the objective world.
Modernists also commonly subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth
and a referential theory of language.13 For instance, Searle maintains that
"there is a reality that exists totally independently of us, an observerindependent way that things are, and our statements about that reality are
true 7,14
or false depending on whether they accurately represent how things
are.

In contrast to modernism, postmodernism rejects subject-object
metaphysics, epistemological foundationalism, and referential theories of
language. Postmodernists tend to emphasize the operation and orientation
of power, particularly in language. Hans-Georg Gadamer, for example,
writes that "[t]he speaking of a language is a totality, a structure within
which we have our place-a place which we have not chosen. 15 Even
though they share some basic viewpoints, not all postmodernists are alike
(and neither are all modernists, for that matter). To avoid the confusion
that often swirls around discussions of postmodernism or postmodernity,
this article distinguishes between 16two types of postmodern thinking:
antimodernism and metamodernism.
Antimodernism refers to an extreme; it encompasses a belief in radical
relativism. To the antimodernist, appeals to reason are no more than
rhetorical moves that assert the dominance of one's own cultural
standpoint. There is no way to adjudicate among competing claims of truth
and knowledge. When it comes to textual interpretation, anything goes.
Antimodernism is encountered most often, perhaps, in the deconstructive
writings of some literary theorists. For instance, Harold Bloom writes that
"[e]ither one can believe in a magical theory of all language ... or else
one must yield to a thoroughgoing linguistic nihilism. 1
Metamodernism refers to a more moderate type of postmodernism.1 8
Metamodernists, such as Gadamer and Thomas Kuhn, explain how we use

13. MURPHY, supra note 8, at 2, 8, 18.
14.

JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY 134 (1998).

15. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Beginning of Philosophy 29 (Rod Coltman trans., 1998).
16. I introduced these terms in Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem of Critique: Triangulating
Habermas, Derrida, and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 296 (2005).
17. Harold Bloom, The Breaking of Form, in Deconstruction and Criticism 1, 4 (1979).
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postmodernists. Best & Kellner, supra note 11, at 257-58.

"extreme"
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"reconstructive"
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reason, have knowledge, and discuss truth without invoking the firm
epistemological foundations or subject-object metaphysics of modernism.
They emphasize that our being-in-the-world is hermeneutic: we are always
and already interpreting. As such, our participation in communal traditions
not only limits our perception and understanding but also enables such
perception and understanding in the first place. Gadamer, in particular,
emphasizes how our hermeneutic being-in-the-world empowers us.
Tradition inculcates us with prejudices that open us to the possibility of
understanding or interpretation. Without our prejudices, we would lack
direction: "the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the
literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole
ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world."1' 9
Many modernist commentators decry Jacques Derrida as the archetypal
antimodernist, but he is better categorized as a metamodernist. Like
Gadamer, Derrida explores the conditions of understanding. Indeed,
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and Derrida's deconstruction
.should be understood as complementary postmodem philosophies, as
mutually supportive descriptions of the hermeneutic situation., 20 Derrida,
though using different terminology, agrees with Gadamer that our beingin-the-world is hermeneutic and that both perception and understanding
depend on our being situated in communal traditions. But whereas
Gadamer emphasizes how the hermeneutic situation is empowering,
Derrida instead stresses how it is disempowering. Derrida uncovers how
textual understanding and interpretation always entail the denial of
possible meanings and the suppression of alternative traditions. A
dominant cultural tradition, which forcefully influences our perceptions
and understanding, develops and maintains itself partly through duplicity
and "irreducible violence., 21 Deconstruction aims, therefore, to reveal the
marginalization of the downtrodden and forgotten-the Other.
Yet it is wrong to conclude that Derrida denies that we can understand
the meaning of a text. On the contrary, Derrida maintains that any text or
event has many potential meanings. To be sure, he is not concerned with
deciding among these competing textual interpretations; rather, he is
interested "in relations of force, in differences of force, in everything that
allows, precisely, determinations [of meaning] in given situations to be

19. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem, in CONTEMPORARY
HERMENEUTICS 128, 133 (Josef Bleicher ed., 1980).
20. Stephen M. Feldman, Made for Each Other: The Interdependence of Deconstruction and
Philosophical Hermeneutics, 26 PHIL. & Soc. CRITICISM 51, 52 (2000).
21. JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC 137, 150 (Samuel Weber trans., 1988).
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stabilized. 22 Regardless, Derrida explicitly repudiates relativism as well
as "complete freeplay or undecidability., 23 He has "never accepted saying,
or encouraging others to say, just anything at all." 24 In short, despite how
he is so often denigrated, Derrida is a metamodernist, not an
antimodernist.
This Article is primarily focused on the relationship between
modernism and metamodernism, rather than antimodernism. Nonetheless,
since the article discusses a number of postmodern writers and modernists
who attack postmodernism, none of whom use the term metamodernism,
this Article will mostly use the term postmodernism to mean
metamodernism.
Part I of this Article explains the three forms of contention that both
modernists and postmodernists use in the conflicts between the paradigms
of modernism and postmodernism. Part II analyzes the relationship
between the competing but incommensurable paradigms, focusing in
particular on the implications that flow from recognizing the three forms
of contention. Part III concludes the article by explaining the potential of
law as a source of ideas for other disciplines.
I. THE FORMs OF CONTENTION

One form of contention that both modernists and postmodernists use is
the argument of repudiation, where a participant in one paradigm attempts
to repudiate or controvert the other. Such arguments tend to be analytical
and logical. John Ellis's book, Against Deconstruction, is an exemplar of
such an argument. It is one long series of repudiation arguments that
attempt to show the imprecise reasoning in deconstructive writings,
especially those of Derrida.
For example, Derrida argues that speech has been privileged, both
traditionally and logically, over writing. Going back to Aristotle, Derrida
shows that writing has been assumed to be derivative; it lives off of
speech. Writing is the signifier that must represent a signified, which is the
spoken word. Speech is the privileged origin. Derrida then deconstructs
this privileging by showing that speech also depends on writing; writing
is, in some senses, the origin.

22. Id. at 148.
23. Id. at 115.
24. Id. at 145.
25. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY

1976).

11-12, 30 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans.,
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Ellis, however, argues that Derrida's position is backwards, both
historically and logically. As a historical matter, Ellis maintains that
Western linguists have "always paid too much attention to the texts and
26
manuscripts of written language," at the expense of the spoken word.
Ellis's logical critique stems from his (perhaps mistaken) reading of
Derrida. According to Ellis, Derrida not only intended to demonstrate and
to deconstruct the ordinary privileging of speech over writing but also
aimed to reverse the privileging. "More important still," continues Ellis,
are the obvious logical problems involved in asserting that writing is
prior to speech." 2 Human speech existed long before writing was
invented, and some extant languages are spoken but not written, yet none
are written but not spoken.
One common type of modernist repudiation argument revolves around
a binary opposition. First, the modernist thinker identifies one or more
"binary" oppositions-either/or types of arguments-which flow from
subject-object metaphysics and thus typify modernist thought. 28 For
instance, modernists often declare that either we have objective
knowledge-knowledge grounded on some firm foundation-or we are
relegated to free-floating subjectivism and relativism. Likewise, some
modernists maintain that either we must be independent subjects with
freedom of will or we must be no more than completely determined
automatons. Then the modernist thinker characterizes the postmodern
position along the binary opposition. Finally, the postmodern position is
rejected because it falls on the wrong side of the either/or.
Ronald Dworkin uses this type of repudiation argument in his attack on
postmodernism. He insists that a true proposition must be objectively true,
or it contains no truth at all. Thus, according to Dworkin, postmodernists
must tacitly assume the objective truth of their own beliefs (particularly
regarding the truth of the postmodern paradigm), or "they could only
present their views as 'subjective' displays in which we need take nothing
but a biographical interest., 29 From Dworkin's modernist perspective, no
sensible thinker would try to demonstrate the truth of her position-such
as postmodernism-only to admit that it was merely a personal statement
of subjective beliefs. Hence, postmodernists unwittingly manifest their

26. JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION 19 (1989).

27. Id. at 21.
CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM 74 (1990).
29. Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You 'd BetterBelieve It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 88
(1996).
28.
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own commitment to modernist objectivity, to "have discovered out there
30
...some external, objective, timeless, mind-independent world."
John Searle presents an interesting twist on this type of repudiation
critique of postmodernism. He builds on the standard modernist binary
opposition between metaphysical realists and antirealists. Searle maintains
that because postmodernists deny that truth and knowledge are grounded
on an external reality, postmodernists must be antirealists or idealists,
perhaps akin to George Berkeley. "[I]f there were external bodies,"
Berkeley wrote, "it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if
there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were
that we have now."3 1 Searle then argues that postmodernists articulate such
an antirealist position only because of "a kind of will to power., 3 2 That is,
according to Searle, postmodernists reject the modernist metaphysics of an
external realism (Searle's preferred position) only so that they can believe
themselves free from the constraints of reality and natural science. Of
course, despite Searle's argument, postmodernists never overtly claim to
assert any kind of will to power, a distinctly modernist concept that
emphasizes the Cartesian subject.
Postmodernists also use analytical and logical arguments of
repudiation. The best deconstructive works, whether of Derrida or others,
closely analyze modernist writings in order to disclose the previously
obscure yet problematic assumptions underlying the texts. For instance, in
jurisprudence, Pierre Schlag demonstrates how a whole host of modernist
scholars assume that their readers are autonomous and independent selves
who can readily choose to effectuate any desirable change in the law.
Schlag explains:
Each and every social, legal, and political event is immediately
represented as an event calling for a value-based choice. You are
free to choose between this and that. But, of course, you are not
free. You are not free because you are constantly required to reenact
the motions of the prescripted, already organized configuration of
the individual being as chooser. You have to, you already are
constructed and channeled as a choosing being.33

30. Id. at 87.
31. George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in THE
ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 509, 529 (Edwin A. Burn: ed., 1939).
32. Searle, supra note 14, at 19.
33. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1627, 1700 (1991).
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By problematizing such assumptions, deconstructive writers call into
question the force or validity of the modernist texts.
Furthermore, just as modernists often criticize postmodern positions by
forcing them into ill-fitting modernist categories, postmodernists repudiate
modernist arguments by understanding them in postmodern terms.
Christopher Norris, for one, adeptly criticizes modernists for their
consistent misinterpretations of postmodern thinkers. Norris himself
accepts postmodernism and thus understands other postmodernists, such as
Derrida, from a postmodern vantage. Consequently, Norris readily
criticizes modernists for failing to do the same. For instance, Norris argues
that Habermas mistakenly reads Derrida from a modernist perspective:
[Habermas] has misread Derrida's work, and done so moreover in a
way that fits in all too readily with commonplace ideas about
deconstruction as a species of latter-day Nietzschean irrationalism,
one that rejects the whole legacy of post-Kantian enlightened
thought. In short, Habermas goes along with the widely-held view
that deconstruction is a matter of collapsing all genre-distinctions.34
Likewise, through a close reading of Derrida's texts, Norris demonstrates
that John Ellis's attack on deconstruction is based on a gross
misinterpretation of Derrida. Because Ellis fails to read Derrida through
the prism of postmodernist categories, Ellis attacks a weakened straw-man
version of deconstruction. According
to Norris, Ellis's arguments thus
5
appear bereft of analytical rigor.1
The second form of contention between the paradigms of modernism
and postmodernism is the argument of advocacy, where a thinker
advocates for-or affirmatively encourages the acceptance of-a given
paradigm. Such arguments tend to be of a coherence or narrative type;
they attempt to show that a particular paradigm hangs together, coheres, or
makes sense only as a whole. On the modernist side, Searle's book, Mind,
Language, and Society, consists largely of an argument of advocacy.
Searle attempts to show that his preferred form of modernist metaphysics,
external realism, not only eliminates traditional mind-body problems but
also persuasively explains consciousness, intentionality, language, and
institutional reality. For Searle, then, the virtue of the modernist paradigm
is that it not only seems to correspond with our experiences but that it also
fits together in a neat and understandable totality. "I want to explain,"

34. Norris, supra note 28, at 49.
35. Id. at 137-51.
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Searle writes, "how certain essential parts of mind, language, and social
reality work and how they form a coherent whole."3 6
On the postmodern side, thinkers from numerous disciplines articulate
a broad advocacy argument. Best and Kellner, Lyotard, Murphy, Steven
Connor, Zygmunt Bauman, Fredric Jameson, and many others attempt to
show that practices from a variety of fields, ranging from art to
philosophy, from anthropology to sociology, even from theology to
science, all share certain commonalities that suggest a break from
modernism. These authors try to demonstrate that these various practices
fit together into a coherent whole, which they call postmodernism.
"[T]here are," according to Murphy, "new ways of understanding
knowledge, language, and reality itself that are in various senses holistic
and that together constitute a radical enough break with modern atomistic
modes of thought to deserve to be called postmodem. 3 To be sure, the
coherence of postmodernism itself is, from a postmodern perspective,
somewhat paradoxical, as Connor emphasizes:
What is striking is precisely the degree of consensus in
postmodernist discourse that there is no longer any possibility of
consensus, the authoritative announcements of the disappearance of
final authority and the promotion and recirculation of a total and
comprehensive narrative of a cultural condition in which totality is
no longer thinkable.38
Despite its paradoxical quality, postmodernism is, in short, a worldview
that hangs together; it makes sense as a totality.
Gadamer and Kuhn present a narrower type of postmodern advocacy
argument through which they attempt to show how specific practices make
sense in accordance with a postmodern (or interpretive) conception of the
world. Gadamer described how his conception of philosophical
hermeneutics illuminates our interpretation of texts. He explains how
textual understanding is possible only because we are imbued with
prejudices that are derived from communal traditions. In a similar vein,
Kuhn explains how science is possible. Individuals learn to do science
within a particular scientific community by becoming enmeshed in the
structures or practices of that community's defining paradigm. The
paradigm not only shapes the questions that scientists find interesting and
worthy of research but also molds the scientists' perceptions of data itself.

36. Searle, supra note 14, at 8.
37. Murphy, supra note 8, at 19.

38. STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE 9 (2d ed. 1989).
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The modernist depiction of scientists who access brute objective data does
not literally make sense, according to Kuhn. An objective external world
could not possibly ground science, because such a world would
necessarily be meaningless. A paradigm is a prerequisite to meaning;
learning and participating in a scientific paradigm engenders a meaningful
world for a scientist.3 9 "'I am not suggesting,"' Kuhn says, "'that there is a
reality which science fails to get at. My point is, rather, that no sense can
be made of the notion of a reality as it has ordinarily functioned in the
philosophy of science."' 40 From Kuhn's standpoint, the idea of a paradigm
makes scientific practice possible. Without paradigms, the world does not
hold together in a meaningful fashion.4 1
The third form of contention between the paradigms of modernism and
postmodernism is the allocation of the burden of proof. The burden of

proof (sometimes called the burden of persuasion or the risk of
nonpersuasion) is a legal term of art. In civil trials, the plaintiff and
defendant each present evidence in an effort to prove facts that show that it
is correct or deserves to win. One side must win and one side must lose,
which remains true even when the evidence is in equipoise-that is, in the
case where a preponderance of evidence does not suggest that either side is
correct. The allocation of the burden of proof decides such a case. Quite
simply, the party, either the plaintiff or the defendant, who bears the
burden of proof loses in cases of equipoise. To be clear, the party who
bears the burden of proof loses, not because of some compelling reason,
but only because she did not carry the burden by persuading the trier of
fact (a judge or jury) that she was correct. 42 In the book, Civil Procedure,
Fleming James and Geoffrey C. Hazard assert that a need to allocate the
burden of proof "seems to be inseparable from any system wherein issues
of fact are to be decided on any rational basis by human beings., 43 The
same is true in the confrontation between the modern and postmodern
paradigms.
Modernists and postmodernists alike allocate the burden of proof to
reinforce their own contentions. Modernists, of course, allocate the burden
to the postmodernists while postmodernists allocate it to modernists. In a
confrontation between incompatible and incommensurable paradigms, the

39. Kuhn, supra note 7, at43-51.
40.

PAUL K. FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD 272 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added).

41. For an interesting recent critique of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions, see STEVE
FULLER, THOMAS KUHN: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY FOR OUR TIMES (2000).
42. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 7.5-7.9 (2d ed.
1977).

43. Id. §7.6, at 242.
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allocation of the burden of proof is of enormous significance. Both
modernists and postmodernists present repudiation and advocacy
arguments, but neither side has arguments that are so philosophically
compelling that masses of their opponents will be persuaded to switch
sides. Indeed, the arguments on both sides are so similar in form that
hardly anyone is likely to be convinced to change positions. In such a
stalemate, the allocation of the burden of proof to one's opponent can be
an effective rhetorical move. Even if modernists do not have any
overwhelming arguments of repudiation or advocacy, they will appear to
win the confrontation if they place the burden of proof on the
postmodernists-who also lack any overwhelming arguments. Likewise,
postmodernists can appear to win if they allocate the burden of proof to
the modernists.
In law, a variety of factors might justify allocating the burden of proof
to either the plaintiff or the defendant. These factors-"reasons of
convenience, fairness, and policy" 44 do not, however, transfer
meaningfully into the philosophical battle between paradigms. In fact,
modernists and postmodernists often allocate the burden of proof
implicitly or tacitly. In these instances, they do not affirmatively present
an argument for allocating the burden. Rather, they merely assume that the
other side bears the burden, which is thoroughly predictable. If one is a
modernist, then one sees and understands the world through the modernist
paradigm. Postmodernism will look odd, confusing, irrational, and so
forth. It would take a herculean argument to convince or force a modernist
to switch sides. But no less could be said about a postmodernist.
However, some modernists and postmodernists do explicitly argue to
allocate the burden of proof to the other side. On behalf of the modernists,
Searle defends certain "default positions" or "taken-for-granted
presuppositions" about the world. 45 These presuppositions form a
"[b]ackground" for our thought and language. 46 In particular, according to
Searle, modernist metaphysics provides the default position or
presuppositions: a real world independent of us exists and is intelligible so
that truth is based on correspondence to that world. To say that modernist
metaphysics is the default position, as Searle does, is equivalent to saying
that postmodernists bear the burden of proof. Unless postmodernists can
convince us otherwise, Searle suggests, we should remain in our default
position and accept our taken-for-granted modernist presuppositions. But

44. Id. §7.9, at 256.
45. Searle, supra note 14, at 9-10.
46. Id. at 10.
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why should we accept these presuppositions as the default? Searle answers
with history: "It is unlikely that the default positions would have survived
the rough and tumble of human history for centuries, and sometimes even
millennia, if they were as false as [some] philosophers make them out to
be. 47 Searle acknowledges that "not all default positions are true," but in
general, "the default positions are more likely to be right than their
alternatives. ,,41
The difficulty for Searle and other modernists is that postmodernists
can just as easily construct a historical argument going in the opposite
direction. Rorty and Richard J. Bernstein articulate this type of contention.
Modernists have had nearly four centuries, since the time of Descartes, to
fulfill their self-imposed goal of establishing some firm foundation for
knowledge and truth. Unfortunately, they have failed to do so. We are still
waiting, Rorty and Bernstein argue, for a modernist to prove convincingly
the independent existence of an intelligible external world. This historical
argument, of course, does not disprove modernism; it is not an argument
of repudiation. Rather, it is an argument for allocating the burden of proof.
That is, Rorty and Bernstein suggest that modernists have had ample
opportunity-nearly 400 years worth-to prove their position, yet they
have failed to do so. 49 After such an extended period of failure, perhaps we
should start assuming that the presuppositions of modernist metaphysics
are wrong. We should, in other words, shift the burden of proof to the
modernists, thus making postmodernism our default position.
II. MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM RELATED
The repetitive forms of contention shared by modernists and
postmodernists suggest a basic, though important, point about the
relationship between the two paradigms: modernists will be modernists,
and postmodernists will be postmodernists. The discussion of repudiation
arguments shows that each side interprets texts in accordance with its own
presuppositions and categories. When the modernist, in effect, translates
the postmodernist's ideas into modernist terms, the ideas very well might
seem weak and imprecise. They lose their bite, even their sense, in the
translation from one paradigm to the other. Similarly, when a
postmodernist reads modernist texts from a postmodern standpoint, the
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modernist texts will likely appear hopelessly obtuse and simplistic.
Therefore, one may readily criticize the other for sloppy thinking.
When we turn to arguments of advocacy, the incommensurability of
the two paradigms is similarly manifested. Each side advocates for its
paradigm by attempting to show that various parts of its position make
sense, cohere, or hang together. As Kuhn comments about scientific
paradigms, "[e]ach group uses its own paradigm to argue in that
paradigm's defense. 50 Such an argument for a particular paradigm, Kuhn
adds, "cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for
those who refuse to step into the circle.'' In short, modernists find
modernist views appealing, while postmodernists find postmodernist
arguments appealing.
This basic point regarding the incommensurability of modernism and
postmodernism also surfaces when we examine arguments for allocating
the burden of proof. Because the burden of proof is always allocated to
one side, modernists and postmodernists never will starve to death like
Buridian's ass, who was paralyzed into indecision and, hence starvation,
when faced with two equally appealing stacks of hay. 2 Thinkers on both
sides of the divide invariably will be able to decide between modernism
and postmodernism, although only because of the burden of proof rather
than for some compelling philosophical reason. Modernists and
postmodernists can always decide between the paradigms, because they
already are modernists or postmodernists when they start the argument. In
a different sense, though, modernists and postmodernists do not truly
decide at all. No active decision is necessary; they already stand on one
side of the divide or the other. They just stay put.
Because the paradigms are incommensurable, even when modernists
and postmodernists appear to discuss the same fundamental concepts, such
as knowledge, truth, and reason, they give the concepts significantly
different meanings and connotations. Thus, while participants in the
competing but incommensurable paradigms might appear to talk to each
other, often they just do not seem to connect. They fail to communicate
well. Kuhn observes that scientists working in opposed paradigms "will
inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits of
their respective paradigms. 53 Moreover, participants in incommensurable
paradigms frequently do not even want to talk about the same issues; they

50. Kuhn, supra note 7, at 94.
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53. Kuhn, supra note 7, at 109.
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"disagree about what is a problem and what a solution."54 Modernist
philosophers tend to dwell anxiously on the existence or non-existence of
firm foundations. After all, from the modernist perspective, if we do not
have firm foundations, we are doomed to relativism and nihilism.
Postmodernists will discuss these issues, but they do not consider them to
be particularly important. Postmodernists would generally prefer to move
on to other issues, such as the orientation of power in society. For that
reason, a postmodernist is more likely to write a history (or genealogy)
that criticizes the development of certain social arrangements or
institutions, such as the prison system, than to present an abstract,
philosophical argument that explains how to ground a perfectly just
society.
To be sure, then, modernists will be modernists, and postmodernists
will be postmodernists. It is tempting to say that never the twain shall
meet, but such a glib conclusion would be imprecise. Although the
modernist and postmodernist paradigms are incommensurable, they do
overlap to a degree. As already mentioned, at least at a superficial level,
modernists and postmodernists, particularly metamodernists, often use
similar terms, such as knowledge, truth, and reason. More importantly, the
overlap extends beyond the mere homophonic sound of certain terms. For
instance, repudiation arguments tend to be analytical or logical. Close
analysis and logic are methods most often associated with modernist
philosophy. Yet, as discussed, postmodernists also construct analytical and
logical arguments of repudiation. Likewise, advocacy arguments tend to
rely on coherence and narrative, methods most often associated with
postmodernism. Yet modernists also rely on coherence and narrative
advocacy arguments. In short, neither is above using the other's favorite
argumentative tools.
Once again, Searle's Mind, Language, and Society provides a striking
example. Searle aims to defend external realism, a type of modernist
metaphysics: "I think that the universe exists quite independently of our
minds and that.., we can come to comprehend its nature. 56 At one point,
though, Searle acknowledges that external realism cannot "be justified on
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its own."5 Indeed, he does "not believe it makes any sense to ask for a
justification" of external realism. 8 Searle elaborates:
External realism is not a claim about the existence of this or that
object, but rather a presupposition of the way we understand such
claims.... This does not mean that realism is an unprovable theory;
rather, it means that realism is not a theory at all but the framework
within which it is possible to have theories.' 9
Although Searle certainly never admits as much, his characterization of
external realism sounds remarkably like the description of a paradigm, a
set of presupposed beliefs that pervasively shapes one's perceptions of and
orientation toward the world. According to Searle, but for external realism,
discussions of the physical world would be "unintelligible., 60 External
realism is the prerequisite or "framework that is necessary for it to be even
possible to hold opinions or theories about such things as planetary
movements., 61 The problem for Searle is that, even though he is
advocating for a modernist metaphysics, the paradigm is a prototypical
62
postmodern concept that Searle himself criticizes. In other words, Searle
presents an implicitly postmodern description of and argument for external
realism as a paradigm.
Hence,
even
though
modernism
and postmodernism
are
incommensurable paradigms, they share the use of certain tools and
perspectives. In fact, while modernists and postmodernists typically talk
past each other, they still can carry on a conversation. Modernists and
postmodernists share enough across the border of the modern/postmodern
divide that they can and do communicate, albeit often poorly. Moreover,
the modern/postmodern border is not completely closed. The border is
permeable. For example, it is likely that many postmodernists began their
careers on the modernist side and then switched, though probably at a
relatively early age such as during their undergraduate years. Although
movement between sides is possible, it is more likely that modernists will
remain modernists, and postmodernists will remain postmodernists.
Individuals on each side of the divide do try to convince the other to
switch sides though. Most often, of course, they do so in a futile manner,
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because modernists tend to use modernist arguments and postmodernists
tend to use postmodern arguments. Thus, arguments to switch will seem
most persuasive to those already on the same side as the proponent.
Movement between sides may be possible, but, ultimately, it is unlikely
and rare.
CONCLUSION

The discipline of law has long been a borrower but not a supplier of
ideas. Law professors frequently adopt insights from their university
colleagues in other departments, but those non-law school colleagues
rarely borrow from legal scholarship. This article suggested how this
process might become more reciprocal. Its primary purpose, in other
words, has been to demonstrate the potential of law as a source of ideas for
other disciplines.
Specifically, the article has argued that the burden of proof illuminates
the confrontation between modernists and postmodernists. For both
modernists and postmodernists alike, when their arguments of repudiation
and advocacy fail to prove conclusively the superiority of their respective
positions, they rely on the burden of proof to win the day. Because
modernism and postmodernism are incommensurable paradigms, the
confrontation between them is likely to end in a stalemate with the
allocation of the burden of proof then appearing to be determinative. Since
each side place the burden of proof on the other, the allocation of the
burden of proof tends to do no more than reconfirm the correctness of
one's own already-established position.
The burden of proof is just one among many legal concepts that can
help elucidate solutions to problems within other disciplines. Especially in
this time of avid cross-disciplinary pollination, law no longer should be
ignored or marginalized on university campuses. There is more reason
now, than ever before, for non-law professors to look to legal scholarship
for potential ideas. As J.M. Balkin observes: "Law has become a sort of
meeting ground for academic ideas and trends. And because it has become
an interdisciplinary crossroads-affected and infected by so many
different influences-law has become, as perhaps never before in
American history, one of the most absorbing intellectual subjects."6 3 For
this reason, legal scholarship can become a centralized source of
inspiration and insight for interdisciplinary scholars of any stripe. Non-law
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professors should recognize legal scholars, or at least some of them, as
interdisciplinary experts, well-versed in the problems that arise and the
strategies that work when integrating a variety of disciplinary views.

